文/ Thomas Hale  翻译/ 陈雷、安然

2013年1月30日，新州前州长Barry O’Farrel发布了关于创建新州政府土地开发机构UrbanGrowth的备忘录。成立UrbanGrowth政府的初衷是通过这一新的跨部门机构，在大型复杂城区改造项目上对设计、协调以及采办等关键环节起到领导作用。成为一个“通过扶持私营开发业而带动旨为新州市民建设高品质生活的家园、工作环境、公共设施的政府机构”。

然而三年半后的今天，许多人开始问UrbanGrowth的创建究竟对新州大型城区改造项目带来了什么积极的变化？

我们看到的宣布建设的项目是UrbanGrowth前身——Landcom的遗留项目。而最近UrbanGrowth的重点项目悉尼海湾区（The Bays Precinct）第一期开发的White Bay旧电厂改造项目 （White Bay Power Station）的招标过程，也由于“私营开发业界没有交出一分合规的标书”而被政府搁置了。

在开发这块前国有工业用地上最新事件的发展凸显了新州城府在大规模城区改造项目上遇到的根本问题。目前新州政府一方面竭力保持自己AAA级的信用评级（即减少负债，转移开发风险），并确保对私营开发业提供高质量住宅和就业用地，然而在另一方面，并不能达到预期想要提高建筑行业竞争力和多样性的目的。

这两个目标不能兼顾的根本原因，那便是政府天真地认为悉尼的私营开发业有足够的宽度与深度来创造出一个真正积极竞争的商业环境。在Bays Precinct这一项目招标的过程中，多家参与竞标的开发商提议与少数几家例如Google, Atlassian等的国际大型企业作为主要租户，但最后能证明有能力完成如此大规模城区改造项目的私营开发商却屈指可数。

Bays Precinct的规划图（https://thebayssydney.com.au/vision-new/）

政府维持的官方说法是，没有一家私营开发商交出一份合规的标书，而现实是，在澳洲很少有开发商有能力承担这样大规模项目带来的商业风险、成功的融资并完成最终的建设与交付。

拿The Bays Precinct整体开发第一期的White Bay Power Station旧发电厂区改建项目为例，此项目的关键挑战在于大规模污染地块的修复需要大量的时间和财力，政府为这栋摇摇欲坠的文物建筑给出了过短的租赁期，规划为10,000高科技人才提供工作环境却没有大规模公共交通、供电供水等基建支持，另外，地块也由于地势的原因受积水的影响。

以上提到的挑战对私营开发商都是极大的开发风险，而政府却为了规避自身的政治风险和保持信用评级，把这些开发风险完全转移到私营开发商头上。

通过公私合作伙伴关系（Public Private Partnership） 并附带开发合约 (Development Agreement) 绑定出售国有大型地块开发项目的方式，从最近的Barangaroo、Darling Harbour以及White Bay项目 (The Bays Precinct 第一期) 看起来不再可行。不是因为行业能力不足，而是因为悉尼私营开发这一行业在大规模项目上没有足够的竞争多样性。政府目前首选的风险管理方法是避免承担项目的债务，并同时声称要增加住房供给、就业土地，刺激当地经济。

而事实证明，现在不良的公私合作伙伴关系不是由开发商造成的，而是因为政府拒绝在像White Bay这样高风险的项目上承担任何风险和债务，并且没有在必要的时候拿出政府领导力，解决供电、污水和雨水排放的问题，并未在社区设施和大规模公共交通方面做出有效的承诺。

UrbanGrowth NSW的负责人常常在公共场合被媒体与业界问起如何才能不让 The Bays Precinct变成第二个人们口中失望的Barangaroo。Urban Growth的负责人不断回答，人们不会再失望了，业界和市民们会看到整个项目的开放透明的过程。

Barangaroo不是由于开发商的贪婪而产生的，如果我们想要获得回报，我们需要一个可以承担风险而不是把所有风险推给私营开发业界的政府。当然，前提是我们的政府允许让不止一家开发商来参与建设。

Thomas Hale

Tzannes城市项目负责人、高级建筑设计师

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Risk& Reward: Procuring Urban Renewal in Sydney.

Author:Thomas Hale, Senior Architect, Tzannes (July 2016)

On 30 January 2013, the then premier of NSW, Barry O’Farrelissued a memorandum on the creation of UrbanGrowth NSW. An exciting newcross-departmental agency that would lead the design, coordination andprocurement of redevelopment and “enablea thriving private sector development industry to deliver homes, workplaces,facilities and places needed for NSW citizens to enjoy a high quality of life.”

Move forward 3.5 years and many are asking what differencethis has made.

The projects we see being announced for construction arelegacy projects of Landcom’s, a NSW government developer that was folded intoUrbanGrowth NSW, and the jewel in the crown “The Bays Precinct” has stalledbecause the “thriving private sector development industry” was not able toproduce a single complying proposal.

This latest episode in the renewal of state-owned formerindustrial sites has highlighted the problem of development in NSW where thestate government is now caught between a desire to maintain a AAA creditrating, ensure housing and employment lands in prime sites are released to theprivate sector and open up competition and diversity in the constructionsector.

If there is any fault in this process, it is a naivety onthe part of Government that Sydney has a development industry large enough toprovide the desired competition for this site with many tenderers courting thesame pool of multi-national anchor tenants and few having a demonstratedability to deliver.

Contrary to no single developer being able to produce acomplying proposal, the reality is that there are very few developers inAustralia who have the capacity to understand, finance and deliver the scaleand complexity of muli-use projects like white bay which required significantremediation of contaminated lands, the adaptive re-use of a crumbling heritagebuilding which was to be given lease terms that few private investors findattractive, and provision of tech employment floor space for 10,000 people plusancillary uses in a location which has no mass public transit, insufficientpower, water and sewage, and sits in a flood plain.

The risks for private sector are significant and it seemsthat for the State political risk has now outweighed development risk.

Public Private Partnerships and the sale of large lots withdevelopment agreements like Barangaroo, Darling Harbour and White Bay no longerseem viable, not because of an industry that is not capable, but an industrythat is not particularly diverse. The preferred risk management method used todate, where Government avoids carrying the debt of a project in addition toclaiming increased housing supply, employment lands, stimulation of the localeconomy, has shown that it is not the evil developer that has caused thisoutcome but Government’s refusal to accept the risk and debt that comes withthe renewal of sites that are expensive and problematic to decontaminate andprovide with the necessary loss-leaders of power, sewer, community facilitiesand public transport.

Every public forum attended by the CEO of UrbanGrowth NSWhas seen him badgered by repeated questions of how this will not become anotherBarangaroo. Mr Pitchford has responded consistently that it will not be and forpeople to continue to watch the open and transparent process through which itwill be delivered.

It is not developer greed but development risk that hasproduced Barangaroo. If we want the reward, we need a Government that willshoulder the risks that private sector cannot address. Of course that is onlyif it wants a world-class outcome delivered by more than one developer.

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